A New Challenge

By "challenge", I meant a challenge to American interests. So, you're right, substantial numbers of our forces are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the outcome of Iraq is all but assured. Even were our forces to be run out of that country tomorrow, unlikely as that seems, our primary strategic challenge there - and the focus of GWOT - was al Qaeda, and it is defeated.

As for Afghanistan, everyone accepts that Afghanistan is more or less pacified to the extent that it can be with the forces deployed. The challenge is not in Afghanistan, but rather from opposing forces based in Pakistan, where we are not deployed, and have no intention to be deployed. In addition, these opposing forces (the Taliban) are indigenous and ethnic in nature; their focus is on dominating Afghanistan as they once did, not using Afghanistan as a launchpad for challenging American policy elsewhere - as al Qaeda did.

In other words, we invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to establish theatres to challenge al Qaeda's power base and sanctuary in the Arab and Muslim world. This has been achieved. The remnants of al Qaeda and its affiliates will take some time to be fully extinguished, but our primary war aims have been achieved - al Qaeda has lost the ability to function effectively as a transnational organization with a coherent geopolitical agenda.

Our victories over al Qaeda have exposed us to new challenges, both arising from indigenous forces resisting the projection of our power in their respective regions - Iran and Pakistan. However, these challenges are not connected to GWOT; indeed, both nations have generally, if peripherally, supported our efforts in GWOT. They are now resisting our secondary objectives - the transformation of the region into one that is a conduit for American interests and power.

So, again, I would argue that GWOT has concluded. We certainly are dealing with the consequences of GWOT policies, but these are askew to our original intentions. Iran and Pakistan are real challenges, but of a secondary and self-limited nature. They do not seriously threaten the American strategic equation, though they may contest our regional posture.

In contrast, the challenge to Eastern Europe - the rise of the Russian bear - is a more fundamental American interest, and one with broad consequences for our nation and our allies. History has shown that a Russia that is confident, able to project power and insulate itself with satellites and client states, is a Russia which will come crashing into truly vital American interests.