The War on Terror

Let's define our terms. When I speak of our nation at war, I do not mean that our goal is to prevent any lone lunatic from committing mass violence. This is impossible, and we have our own domestic terrorists to prove it.

I do not believe we are in a clash of civilizations. Seven years ago, there was an entity, a transnational organization, which planned and executed an attack on this country, as part of a greater plan to force an American withdrawal from the Middle East, overthrow Arab regimes which have traditionally relied on American protection, and thus recreate the Islamic Caliphate.

Grandiose those ideas may sound today, but it was merely two years ago that al Qaeda in Iraq declared an Islamic Caliphate, replete with a governing structure, Sharia courts and tax system. It is fortunate that we found a general in Petreaus who developed a strategy to reverse the course of war in Iraq and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Al Qaeda's vision, so close to fruition, has now been relegated to the dustbin of history.

With our successes in Iraq have come successes by allies - such as the Saudis - to cut off funding for al Qaeda and its affiliates. The Saudis really only began this when they themselves were bombed, repeatedly. The Arab world has never been so hostile to Islamic extremism as it is today, in no small part due to our intervention in Iraq.

Instead of fostering radicalism, our invasion and occupation demonstrated the savagery of the enemy and exhausted their credibility on the street as a legitimate alternative to westernization (or as the Arabs prefer to call it: modernization).

The inability of Al Qaeda nodes to conduct any meaningful attacks against us or our regional allies demonstrates the degree to which their capabilities have been degraded. This is not the same organization that executed so efficiently on 9/11, with such geopolitical savvy in Madrid, so stealthily in London, or so brazenly in Riyadh or Istanbul.

Their inability to reconstitute and retaliate demonstrates that the pressure we and our allies have put on their organization is perhaps beyond that structure's ability to adapt.

So what does any of this mean?

One terrorist attack that kills 3000 people is a pinprick. It means little to a country of 300 million. The power of terrorism is in the geopolitical implications behind its execution; terror is a tactic used to achieve geopolitical objectives.

In the case of al Qaeda, the objective was to drive American power from the Middle East in order to weaken, destabilize and ultimately to destroy Arab governments, in order to create an Islamic Caliphate on the ruins.

No one goes to war without a plan, and al Qaeda was no different. They believed they could execute all of the above and achieve their ultimate objectives. Today, they are further from their objectives than ever. Even if they could nuke one of our cities, what would it really change on the ground? They have lost the Arab street, and with it, any hope of gaining power.

In other words, a terrorist organization is only effective to the extent that its actions can effect geopolitical change. Once their ability to effect this change is reduced or eliminated, they have little rational incentive to continue fighting.

We are clearly coming to a point when al Qaeda cannot effect geopolitical change through its actions. Perhaps it can strike back, but my suspicion is that if they had a plan, they would have acted on it sooner than later. The longer they hold back, the more losses they incur.

With their defeat, we win the war. Then you can try them...